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Abstract
In the last decades of the 20th century, the revival of traditional Confucianism assumed 
increasing importance and relevance. The revitalization of its complex philosophical 
heritage thus became part of the most important theoretical currents in contemporary 
East Asian societies. Due to its potentially stabilizing social function and compatibility 
with capitalism, Confucianism is often seen as the Asian equivalent of Max Weber’s 
“protestant ethic”. In modern sinology, this view is known as the “post-Confucian hy-
pothesis”. The appearance of the “vacuum of values” in modern China and its problem-
atization and connection to the transformation of the structure, role, and function of 
social knowledge provide a good example of the consequences of explosive social trans-
formation. This also raises the question of whether the Confucian modernization model 
is indeed capable of generating a non-individualistic version of modernity. Proceeding 
from this hypothesis, the present paper aims to show that the purported relation be-
tween modernity and individualism, which international modernization theories have 
always viewed as “inevitable” or “intrinsic”, is, in fact, little more than an outcome of 
Western historical paradigms. 
Keywords: Confucianism, Modern Confucianism, cultural heritage, East Asian modern-
ization, social knowledge
Med tradicijo in modernostjo: moderno konfucijanstvo kot oblika vzhod-
noazijskega družbenega vedenja
Izvleček
V zadnjih desetletjih dvajsetega stoletja postaja preporod konfucijanstva v vzhodnoazi-
jskih regijah vse pomembnejši. Ponovna oživitev njegove raznovrstne idejne in kulturne 
dediščine postaja v teh regijah vse vplivnejša. Idejno ozadje konfucijanstva pa sodi k 
osrednjim temam teoretske struje modernega konfucijanstva, ki se uvršča k najpomem-
bnejšim diskurzom sodobne Vzhodne Azije. Njegovo zmožnost, da uravnoveša družbo 
in da je združljiv s kapitalističnim sistemom, pogosto primerjajo s funkcijami, ki jih je 
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po Webru prevzela protestantska etika. V sodobni sinologiji se pogled na konfucijan-
stvo imenuje »post-konfucijanska hipoteza«. Problematizacija t.i. »vakuuma vrednot« v 
sodobni Vzhodni Aziji in njegova povezava z družbenim znanjem ter s transformacijo 
njegove strukture, njegovih vlog ter funkcij nam lahko služi kot dober primer posledic 
eksplozivnih družbenih sprememb. Vse to nas med drugim napeljuje na vprašanje o 
tem, ali je model modernizacije konfucijanstva sploh sposoben generirati ne-individ-
ualistično inačico modernosti. Izhajajoč iz te hipoteze bo obravnavani članek prikazal 
dejstvo, da je povezava med individualizmom in modernostjo, ki v večini klasičnih za-
hodnih teorij modernizacije velja za intristično oziroma nujno, v resnici zgolj rezultat 
zahodnih zgodovinskih paradigem.
Ključne besede: konfucijanstvo, moderno konfucijanstvo, kulturna dediščina, vzhod-
noazijska modernizacija, družbeno znanje
Introduction––Social Knowledge and the Confucian Revival  
in East Asia
Proceeding from the notion of Confucianism as a form of social knowledge in 
East Asia, and speaking about its impact upon the specific features of East Asian 
modernization, we first have to clarify the meaning of these crucial terms within 
the referential framework of the present paper. In this paper, the term East Asia 
does not refer to a geographic or geo-political area, but rather to a cultural zone, 
one that is defined through various common cultural heritages, especially through 
the common Confucian ideational tradition. In this sense, Vietnam, for instance, 
is also part of East Asia, although in a strictly geographic sense it belongs to 
Southeast Asia. 
When speaking about a “common Confucian tradition” we must ask ourselves 
how this term, which refers to a complex ideational system, relates to a common 
East Asian culture and its epistemology. Confucianism as a form of knowledge 
is a particularly important part of the ideas and ideologies underlying East Asian 
societies, and constitutes the main body of traditional learning (Li and Yan 2006, 
561). Various parts of this multi-faceted ideational system this form important 
elements of contemporary East Asian social knowledge. This is a form of knowl-
edge that constitutes an epistemological common thread in societies, cultures, and 
communities. In contrast to personal knowledge, social knowledge is formed by 
a common ideational background, which provides a set of evaluative criteria that 
incoming information is assessed by. In other words: while personal knowledge 
and justification are based on the coherent integration of individual information, 
social knowledge and justification are based on the coherent aggregation of social 
information (Lehrer 1987, 87), as shared by individuals belonging to a certain 
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social group. Here, we must also point out that this kind of social information is 
not limited to learning or perceiving what is conveyed or represented in the realm 
of factuality, but also includes ideas and values. 
Confucianism as a form of knowledge has had a profound and widespread impact 
on traditional Asian societies1. However, social transformations in modern times 
have dislodged traditional and pre-modern forms of Confucianism from the cen-
tre of these societies (Li and Yan 2006, 561). On the other hand, the revitalization 
of traditional Confucian thought is one of the most important intellectual cur-
rents in contemporary Eastern Asia. In China, which is the historical “cradle” of 
Confucian cultures and philosophies, this revitalization began on the threshold of 
the 20th century, and manifested itself in the intellectual current of the so-called 
New or Modern Confucianism (Xin ruxue2). 
In international sinology, this line of thought is translated with various names, 
ranging from Neo-Confucianism or Contemporary or Modern Neo-Confucianism, 
to New Confucianism and Modern or Contemporary Confucianism. The first set, 
which includes the term Neo-Confucianism, is impractical because it is often 
confused with Neo-Confucianism (sic), a term that in Western sinology denotes 
the reformed Confucian philosophies of the Song and Ming periods (li xue or 
xingli xue). I therefore generally prefer the term Modern Confucianism, given that 
we are dealing with philosophical discourses that belong to Chinese modernity.
Because the Confucian renaissance as a new, modern intellectual movement start-
ed in China, its main representatives are also mainly found among modern and 
contemporary Chinese philosophers, although the Confucian revival is increasingly 
shaping the current academic scenes in other East Asian societies. In the present 
paper, however, we will concentrate upon the work of the central representatives of 
these currents who lived and worked (or still live and work) in the Chinese linguistic 
area. In order to clarify the abovementioned research question on the relation be-
tween Confucianism as a form of social knowledge on the one hand, and its impact 
upon the specific features of East Asian modernization on the other, we shall thus 
examine and introduce some of the most important epistemological elements con-
tained in the writings of the most prominent representatives of this revival. These 
analyses will be based on the works of many philosophers belonging to all three 
1 For scholars such as Joseph Levenson, Myron Cohen, and Margery Wolf, Confucianism is an 
outdated patriarchal ideology whose gradual disappearance is highly desirable, as this would open 
up areas for the consolidation of a new and much-needed cultural transformation. Instead, for other 
scholars, Confucianism is a sine qua non for any “Chineseness”, and must thus be maintained 
and further developed in the contemporary world (Ames 2001, 71).
2 新儒學
Azijske_studije_2017_2_FINAL.indd   45 4.7.2017   10:06:10
46 Jana S. Rošker: Between Tradition and Modernity...
generations of Modern Confucianism,3 including Xiong Shili, Zhang Junmai, and 
Liang Shuming from the first generation, Mou Zongsan, Xu Fuguan, Tang Junyi, 
and Fang Dongmei from the second, and Tu Weiming and Chen Lai from the third.
Modern Confucianism and the Special Features of East Asian 
Modernization
Modern Confucianism is defined by a search for syntheses between Euro-Amer-
ican and traditional East Asian thought. It aims to develop a system of values, 
ideas and concepts that could prove itself capable of resolving the social, political, 
and axiological problems of globalized modern societies. In order to establish a 
model in which modernization is not simply equated or confused with Western-
ization, scholars who belong to this stream of thought often attempt to revive 
“classical Confucian” values by adapting and reconciling them with the demands 
of the present time (see Tu 2000 and 2014). 
In this context, it is important to consider the fact that since the latter half of the 
previous century East Asian societies have been constantly changing the map of 
world progress: as a result, the balance of economic and political power is shifting 
from the West to the East. This process has its roots in a number of transforma-
tions in ideational and material paradigms by which the development of East 
Asian regions can be defined, and which also strongly influence international re-
lations at the global level. If we want to understand these transformations in the 
context of their individual cultural backgrounds, we must adopt a broader perspec-
tive, for their internal structures are by no means limited to (visible and measura-
ble) economic, political, and ecological issues. On a deeper ideational level, these 
transformations are also tightly linked to the political and social roles of culturally 
conditioned values and ideologies. These––often only latently present––ideational 
factors represent the crucial axiological and epistemological foundations, as well 
as an inherent binding, of all the specific institutions that are typical for these 
societies. Confucianism undoubtedly is one of these key ideational foundations. It 
is based on the incorporation of ideas linked to the concept of a “relational self ”. 
The concrete collective social consciousness that underlies this mode of (self )-re-
flection manifests itself in the condition of the relational individual, who is nec-
essarily and existentially an organic part of a social group. Such consciousness is 
reflected in the manner in which any given individuals come to view themselves 
as a part of a group, and in which patterns of commonality among individuals 
3 The categorization into “generations” follows a long tradition in Confucian scholarship, which is 
ultimately rooted in classical Confucianism.
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bring explicit unity to inter-personal relations. This specific view of the relation 
between the individual and society has been of crucial importance for shaping the 
Modern Confucian version of “Chinese” or “East Asian Modernity”, for in this 
renewed system the concept of individualism can be replaced by individualisation 
(Abbeg 1970, 210), i.e. in the full realization of each individual’s potential within 
the relational network of their interactions with the “Others”.
The prevailing classical Western modernization theories have created a tradition 
that interprets the relation between past and present (i.e. “tradition” and “mo-
dernity”) in a Eurocentric manner, one that remains globally predominant even 
today. Although they differ from each other, they still have a common basis, estab-
lished upon the supposition that “traditional” and “modern” cultures or societies 
always represent two systems of interrelated variables. In their various re-formula-
tions of the dichotomy between tradition and modernity, this transition has been 
understood as a process in which the first one falls into decline and the latter is 
then established (Bendix 1967, 307–8). As such, according to these theories social 
systems are grounded on a “before and after” model (ibid. 309). In this model “tra-
ditional” and “modern” social structures are distinguished by two sets of dichot-
omous attributes, and individual societies are classified as more or less “modern” 
according to the degree to which they exhibit one set of attributes rather than an-
other (Rošker 2015, 13). In this context, tradition and modernity are widely used 
as polar opposites in a linear theory of social change. In such a view, the concept 
of change in economically growing societies, such as those seen in contemporary 
East Asia, can be understood as one which is conditioned by a linear development 
from a traditional, “conservative” past towards a “highly modernized” future. A 
significant presumption in this bipolar model of change is that the existing insti-
tutions and values that form the “content” of tradition are barriers to progress and 
social change, and are thus seen as obstacles to modernization (ibid.). 
Following such ideas, most dominant Western theories of modernization have 
naturally assumed that East Asia could only develop a dynamic, modern society 
if it abandoned its most important traditional heritage, namely Confucianism. 
Indeed, Karl Marx and several other classical Western modernization theorists 
firmly believed that this ideational system was hindering any kind of real mod-
ernization in this part of the world. For example, Max Weber wrote extensively on 
Asia, especially India and China, concluding that Asian philosophical, religious, 
or cultural traditions could by no means serve as an ideational basis for social, 
political and economic modernization (Makeham 2003, 33). 
On the other hand, Joseph R. Gusfield (1967, 351) pointed out that relations between 
“tradition” and “modernity” do not necessarily imply displacement, exclusiveness or 
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conflicts. Hence, the “modern” must not necessarily or categorically impair the “tradi-
tional”. He noted that traditional forms do not always hinder change and progress, but 
can also provide support for them. 
Modern Confucian scholars also follow similar presumptions. Hence Weber’s 
widely known thesis, according to which Protestant ethics were instrumental in 
the rise and spread of modernization, stands in contrast to a presumption that 
has appeared in Eastern Asia during recent decades, and which is known as the 
“post-Confucian hypothesis”. This hypothesis argues that societies based on Con-
fucian ethics might prove themselves not only as equal, but even superior, to the 
West in terms of modernization, industrialization, and affluence. 
The abovementioned revitalization of Confucian thought, which first appeared 
at the threshold of the twentieth century and which developed in the theoretical 
stream of so-called Modern Confucianism, is certainly among the most important 
factors within such new modernization ideologies (Li 1996, 544). Contemporary 
Confucian scholars thus generally believe that the successful development of East 
Asian societies has been, and remains, mostly due to the particular modernization 
model that has been adopted, one known as “Confucian capitalism” (e.g. Kahn 
1979; Vogel 1979). 
This model is characterised by strong state leadership with a well-developed ad-
ministrative structure, a hierarchical social structure with a well-developed net-
work of social relations, and an emphasis on education. It also stresses virtues such 
as diligence, reliability and persistence together with cooperation, loyalty and a 
strong sense of affiliation with one’s community or organization (Rošker 2015, 3).
In order to acquire a more coherent understanding of the East Asian Confucian 
revival, its socio-epistemological functions in the modernization process, and its 
theories, it is also important to understand that it cannot be seen as a mono-
lithic ideational formation. This revival includes a wide scope of theoretical dis-
courses, which are rooted in a tradition that is already in itself very complex and 
heterogeneous.
Epistemology and Axiology of Social Transformations
Over the last few decades the developmental process of the Confucian revival has 
been tightly linked to the dynamic and complex social transformations seen in 
East Asian societies, in which it functions as one of the most important elements 
of common cultural heritage and social knowledge. In this context, social knowl-
edge can also be defined as one’s ability to understand and predict others’ general 
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patterns of behaviour. Therefore, social transformations are necessarily linked to 
simultaneous transformations of social knowledge. The revival of traditional Con-
fucian values thus represents one of these ideational transformations. 
As already noted, the Confucian revival is rooted in the presumption that East 
Asian modernization cannot be completely identified with Westernization, and 
that the process of modernization necessarily includes both universal and cultur-
ally conditioned elements. Here, we cannot forget that the term modernity, which 
generally denotes a period of social transformation, was developed within Eu-
ro-American discourses, and thus defining the “general” theoretical evolution of 
this concept means (once again) addressing the development of Western theory. 
Hence, we should also stress that in this context that we are not referring to any 
notion of so-called “classic modernity”, i.e. to the Western “New Era”. We rather 
apply this term in the sense of a process of general social transformation or social 
revival, one linked to certain specific conditions that dictate modernization (e.g. 
the enlightenment movements, the dominant role and function of intellectuals, 
the spread of industrialization, and so on). Depending on the concrete specific 
tradition or specific cultural environment in which they took place, such processes 
followed different pathways. However, they always involved the transformation of 
many of the conditions defining transitional societies.
Since the latter half of the 20th century, Southeast Asia has been one of the 
most dynamic economies in the developing world. This process of economic 
change has always been accompanied by several other attributes of modern-
ization, such as the spread of education, modern transportation systems, and 
mass media (Hirschman and Edwards 2007, 4376). The reasons underlying the 
economic success of some countries and the stagnation of others are still subject 
to dispute. The East Asian model of state-sponsored export industrialization 
is widely discussed in academic circles and among policymakers, but the par-
allels between East and Southeast Asian strategies of economic development 
remain rather unclear. An important element in this context is the presence of 
market-driven capitalism. However, the function of the regional governments 
in managing their economies has also been integral to economic development 
in the area. Hirschman and Edwards (2007, 4377) also points to the degree to 
which economic development in the region has been carried out by fairly au-
thoritarian states. “The relationship between democracy and economic growth 
and development, argued to go hand in hand by modernization theorists, seemed 
to be challenged by the experience of Southeast Asian tigers towards the end 
of the twentieth century” (ibid.). However, a lot of research remains to be done 
to investigate the reasons for and implications of economic development and 
modernization in this area. 
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In dealing with the relation between economic growth and democracy, we of-
ten come across the phrase “Asian values”. This has often been used to express a 
key concept put forward by a number of authoritarian ideologies, which claims 
that, in order to contain the presumed threat and risks of “Western” individualism 
within in their own societies, there is a need to promote the “virtues” of Asian 
communitarianism and rigorous government.
“Asian values” as a doctrine of developmentalism can be understood as 
the claim that, until prosperity is achieved, democracy remains an “unaf-
fordable luxury”. This “Protestant ethic” form of “Asian values” attributes 
high growth rates to certain cultural traits. These characteristics include 
hard work, frugality, discipline, and teamwork. Western democracy hin-
ders rapid development, claim authoritarian rulers in the East Asia, and 
thus must be delayed until substantial development has been achieved 
(Thompson 2001, 155–6).
This ideology thus warns against careless assumptions of “Western” democracy, ar-
guing that it could lead Asian countries down the slippery slope of degeneration. 
In this way, “Asian values” have become the dichotomous opposite of everything 
that is seen as wrong with the West. The concept is very problematic, however, as 
it relies on the (wrongly understood) notion of “cultural relativism”, or the idea 
that human rights are contingent upon Asian cultural heritage (Moody 1996, 
166). In such contexts, Western countries are seen as having no right to impose 
their views, concepts and practices on other cultures. 
Even though this notion of “Asian values” has often been closely identified with 
the Confucian tradition (see for example, Fetzer and Soper 2007; Yu 2000; de 
Bary 1998; Lee 2003), this expression, in fact, has almost nothing to do with the 
Modern Confucian scholars or their philosophies. Hence, it is very important to 
be aware of the significant differences between modern and contemporary ad-
aptations of Confucian theory and the related discourse on Asian values, which 
is often mistakenly comprehended as forming part of the Modern Confucian 
stream of thought. 
In general, this stream of thought has nothing much against Western influences, 
as it is even based upon searching for syntheses between Euro-American and 
traditional Chinese (especially Confucian) discourses. The founders of Modern 
Confucianism as a system aimed at a more systematic re-interpretation of tra-
ditional Chinese philosophy and culture, based on a deeper and more compre-
hensive understanding of Western philosophy, especially the thought of Plato, 
Kant and Hegel, as well as other representatives of German Idealism. Given that 
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Modern Confucians viewed modernization primarily as a rationalization of the 
world, they explored their own tradition for authentic concepts comparable to the 
two Western paradigms essential for modernization, i.e. the concepts of subjectiv-
ity, and of reason and rationality.
However, this stream of thought also aims to elaborate and modernize some Con-
fucian values that could be used as a counterweight to the general dispersion of 
values, which is typical for industrial and post-industrial societies. Because one of 
the central axiological elements accompanying profit-driven capitalistic develop-
ments is widespread social alienation, traditional ideational systems have––inter 
alia––been investigated in order to find a solution to the so-called “vacuum of 
values” that appear as an omnipresent manifestation of this phenomenon. In this 
context, Modern Confucianism aims to elaborate on traditional epistemological 
approaches linked to the inherent connections between knowledge and values or 
knowledge and wisdom, focusing on the cultural and axiological conditionality 
of comprehension. In this sense, Confucian philosophers have followed the pre-
sumption that traditional epistemological and ethical concepts could serve as a 
foundation for an “East Asian” modernization theory.
Knowledge and Value
In order to obtain a deeper understanding of the contributions of Modern Confu-
cianism to the solving of the global crisis of values, the present paper will critically 
introduce the epistemological thought of some of its most important represent-
atives. It aims to show the development of the traditional Chinese epistemolog-
ical presumption that moral cultivation is a precondition for any comprehensive 
knowledge. An implication of this premise is that human perception and com-
prehension of reality, which is, in itself, permeated by ethical values4, is not only 
rational, for it is, among other factors, also defined by intentions, desires, and feel-
ings. Modern Confucians assume that the very same demarcation line that divides 
reason and intuition also divides science and philosophy or the humanities. 
In general, Modern Confucians do not oppose science, but are against scientism. 
Moreover, most of them argue that science, which aims at the recognition of 
objects in the external natural world by applying rational and analytical method-
ology, will never be able to solve questions linked to the meaning of life, nor have 
a significant impact on an individual’s worldview. While science explores facts, 
4 On this basis, the contemporary Chinese philosopher Chen Lai elaborated an ontology of the 
central Confucian virtue of humanness (ren) and introduced a vision of a humanness-based ethics, 
pertinent to modern times (Lai 2014).
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philosophy and the humanities investigate meanings and values. As such, Modern 
Confucians claim that the boundary between reason and intuition not only sepa-
rates science and philosophy, but also the realm of phenomena from that of values 
(see for instance Xiong 1992, 357; Mou 1995, 549; Fang 1936, 160; Xu 1960, 2; 
Tang 2000, 293 etc.).
Here we shall take into account that in the holistic Confucian tradition episte-
mology is inseparable from ontology, since every object of cognition is also cogni-
tion itself. The concrete manner of an object’s existence is therefore tightly linked 
to our understanding of it. This link is interactive, for it includes mutual co-de-
pendency. We thus cannot oversimplify the Confucian view by claiming that it 
represents a solipsistic conceptualisation of the world. What is true for the per-
ception of the external world also holds for its comprehension and interpretation, 
which cannot be separated from the whole, but individualized and thoroughly 
changeable, existence of the objects of cognition.
The main streams of thought in traditional Chinese epistemology were primarily 
based on the method of introspection and the intuitive perception of reality. In 
the Neo-Confucianism of the Song (960–1279) and Ming (1368–1644) Dynas-
ties (upon which the majority of Modern Confucian discourses are grounded), 
there were two schools: the first was “realistic”, and was known as the School of 
the Structure (Li xue 理學) or the School of Reason (Xingli xue 性理學). Greatly 
influenced by the teachings of the most important medieval Chinese philosopher, 
Zhu Xi, this epistemology emphasizes realistic modes for the perception of reality, 
and it introduced a new methodology suited to this form of recognition called 
“exploring objects” (ge wu 格物). The latter school, which instead advocated more 
idealistic and intuitive methods of recognizing reality, was named the School of 
the Heart-Mind (Xin xue 心學), and was led by the most famous philosopher of 
the Ming Dynasty, Wang Shouren5. Most Modern Confucian philosophers are 
more influenced by this latter school of thought than by the more realistic phi-
losophy of Zhu Xi. Moreover, they derive their concept of reason from German 
philosophy, which generally occupies an important position in their theories. 
While in China, Marxist theoreticians (such as Jin Yuelin) prescribed absolute 
priority to the rational method, most Modern Confucians (especially Xiong Shili 
and Mou Zongsan) applied the intuitive one. Some of them, however, like Liang 
Shuming (1924, 97–102) and Zhang Junmai (Chang 1954, 100), drew attention 
to the traditional binary understanding of reason and intuition. Here, the two 
methods of inquiry are not only linked to each other, but are also connected to the 
method of reasoning as such, because reasoning is always based on distinguishing. 
5 Also known as Wang Yangming.
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In such a view, philosophers who apply the method of intuition at the same time 
must also apply methods of formal logic and dual differentiations; and those who 
apply the rational method simultaneously use the intuitive one, as well as dual dis-
tinctions6. For Modern Confucians, all these methods––those of dual distinctions 
and intuition, as well as of formal analysis and inferences––are necessary compo-
nents for any coherent philosophical activity. However, the recognition obtained 
from intuitive perception is deeply rooted in cognition, human will, and feelings, 
and thus represents a synthesis on a high epistemological level. Zhang Junmai, 
for instance, pointed out that this synthesis cannot be established by study alone, 
in which intuition and reason appear in a mutually contradictory relation, but 
only on the basis of much broader platforms (Chang 1954, 100). In this con-
text, Xiong Shili and his student Xu Fuguan upgraded Wang Shouren’s method 
of recognition, which they called tiren 體認 (bodily recognition) and tizhi 體知 
(knowledge obtained through the body), respectively. This method is not based on 
intuition in the usual sense, nor on rational reasoning about the logical relations 
between premises and inferences. Instead, tiren is a retrospective and active pro-
cess in which “the subject discovers moral subjectivity in the pseudo-subjectivity 
of human desires and affirms and develops it” (Ni 2002, 287). Here, the word “ren” 
(recognition) means both realization and recognition. One reveals one’s own mor-
al nature through “overcoming the self ” and by “reducing sensual desires” (ibid.).
Most Modern Confucian philosophers are also profoundly interested in ques-
tions regarding the nature of the relation between theory and praxis, i.e. between 
“knowledge and action” (zhi xing 知行), which also represented one of the central 
epistemological problems of traditional, especially Neo-Confucian, discourses7 
(see for instance He Lin 1938). 
In the traditional Confucian conceptual and referential frameworks, the transcend-
ent and empirical spheres of human performance mostly correspond to the dual 
antipodes of “inner sage” and “external ruler” (“neisheng 內聖” and “waiwang 外
王”). As Lee Ming-Huei points out (2001, 15), most Modern Confucians see the 
“inner sage” as a foundation for the concept of the “external ruler”. However, the 
latter cannot be understood only as a kind of extension of the former. Due to their 
striving to establish an East Asian theory of modernization, Modern Confucians 
6 The comprehension of reality based on the method of dual differentiation and distinction, respec-
tively, is rooted in the awareness of binary oppositions like hard-soft, black-white, pleasure-pain, 
etc. They form a contrast, through which objects can be easily categorized and hence integrated 
into the comprehensive perception of reality. 
7 In the framework of the Neo-Confucian philosophy (i.e. the reformed Confucian discourses from 
the Song and Ming Dynasties), this view has been elaborated in greatest detail by Wang Shouren 
and some other representatives of the School of the Heart-Mind (Xin xue).
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aim to establish within the complementary relation between the two polar oppo-
sites something similar to the Western conception of the subject. 
A subject so constituted could thus unite in itself the awareness of the 
“subject of moral practice” (daode shijiande zhuti) in the sphere of spiritual 
life, the awareness of the “political subject” (zhengzhi zhuti) in the field 
of society, and the awareness of the “cognitive subject” or the “subject of 
recognition” (renshi zhuti) in the realm of epistemology and the natural 
world. The inner sage thus had to be posited in the complementary rela-
tion with a “new external ruler” (xin waiwang) who was responsible for 
the development of science and democracy. (Rošker 2016, 156)
In this process of recognition, the unity of knowledge and action (zhixing heyi 知
行合一), as well as the subject and object of recognition, merge into unity. If the 
subject of recognition wants to gain objective knowledge, it must “immerse” (Ni 
2002, 292) itself in the object of recognition, i.e. in all that can be recognized in 
that object. Only in this way can a certain insight becomes genuine knowledge. 
On such a basis, the separation between knowledge and the subject of recognition 
can be completely eliminated, and the incorporation of what has been recognized 
becomes a precondition for its actual and complete recognition. 
In the Neo-Confucian philosophies of the Song and Ming Dynasties, the intui-
tive recognition of reality was closely linked to the concept of innate knowledge 
(liangzhi 良知), which constitutes the core of the moral nature of any individu-
al. This concept, which can be seen as a creative link connecting fact and value, 
has profoundly influenced the entirety of Modern Confucian epistemology. For 
Xiong Shili (1992, 548), one of the pioneers of Modern Confucian stream of 
thought, this innate knowledge, which manifests itself in the infinite heart-mind 
(wuxiande zhixin 無限的知心) and its phenomenal form denoted by the origi-
nal heart-mind (ben xin 本心), is the basic human moral substance and provides 
a foundation of moral performance; it is transcendent and infinitely universal8. 
Many later Modern Confucians, such as Mou Zongsan (1995, 38) and Tang Junyi 
(1985, 53–54), have seen it as a kind of moral compass intrinsic to every individ-
ual. Similarly, Xu Fuguan appropriated the traditional concept of moral reason 
(daode lixing 道德理性), which serves as a fundamental principle for the guidance 
and regulation of human life within the moral heart-mind, and manifests itself 
8 The human heart-mind (xin) as a necessary and constitutional part of the inner moral substance 
(or the inherent individual moral Self ) is the key component in the recognition process. When 
recognizing other human beings, this sensual compatibility must also be based on empathy, a core 
notion defining the abovementioned central Confucian virtue of humanness (ren). 
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as an awareness of the good and ethical within the moral Self or original heart-
mind (Xu 2005, 178). Most Modern Confucian epistemological discourses are 
also based on the presumption that this awareness is innate to all human beings. 
All this led to a modern elaboration of the traditional Confucian moral spir-
it, which is both immanent and transcendent. The Modern Confucian elabora-
tions of such a moral spirit are based on the internalization of traditional religious 
concepts, which were transformed and changed from abstract external ideas into 
symbols denoting different existential forms of the inner moral substance (ibid.). 
As already noted, Modern Confucian epistemology is closely related to its ontol-
ogy, for scholars belonging to this current usually see the world as a metaphysical 
reality that is immanent to all that exists in the universe, while also possessing 
moral qualities (Chan 2002, 306). In this respect, the central Confucian virtue of 
(co)humanness or mutuality (ren 仁) is already part of the cosmic entirety (see 
Chen 2014), while its recognition, or its simultaneous incorporation and internal-
ization, manifests itself in the moral performance of individuals. Chen Lai, who is 
one of the most important current Chinese philosophers, also points out that the 
ideational foundations of this virtue form a basis for a unification between the Self 
and Other, since they are rooted in an awareness of the importance of community, 
and thus in an awareness of one’s own social responsibility (Chen 2014a, 41). 
Knowledge and Wisdom
This kind of ethically conditioned knowledge is also tightly connected to the no-
tion of wisdom, or, in other words, to the differentiation between factual and ax-
iological knowledge. In contrast to the former, the latter is not only grounded in 
perceiving, gathering, and applying factual information, but also includes its con-
crete evaluation, allowing us to apply it in reasonable and ethically irreproachable 
ways. This kind of knowledge is grounded in an ethically aware understanding 
and evaluating of different positions in various social contexts. It is rooted in the 
difference between facts and values, i.e. in a classical epistemological distinction, 
which appeared in almost all traditional philosophies, and which has gained a lot 
of attention in modern times in the form of the increasingly problematic relation 
between science and humanities. 
Hence, throughout the twentieth century, various attempts at clarifying the re-
lation between knowledge and wisdom emerged to the forefront of Modern 
Confucian philosophies. This task implied the need for a transformation of these 
traditional discourses, which could not be comprehended, applied, reproduced, 
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or developed beyond the specific frameworks of the Chinese tradition. Hence, 
this aspect has been connected to the need for the analytical reconstruction of 
traditional concepts in the context of social modernization. Most of the Modern 
Confucians were well aware of the importance of this task, for it preconditioned 
any possibility of adapting these frameworks to the modern era and, hence, of 
turning them into a possible foundation of new, contemporary social knowledge. 
In these endeavours they aimed to fill the emerging “vacuum of values”, which 
manifested itself in social dispersion and a complete lack of generally binding 
axiological norms or criteria. 
Many Modern Confucians elaborated on the concept of wisdom, as can already 
be found in Xiong Shili’s theories on the difference between qualitative (xingzhi 
性智) and quantitative (liangzhi 量智) understanding (Rošker 2009, 376). In 
his Three Kinds of Philosophical Wisdom (Zhexue san hui, 2007), Fang Dongmei 
also unites the notions “li 理” (reason) and “qing 情” (feeling, sensation) into an 
epistemological concept of “sensuous reason (qingli 情理)”. In its unification of 
rationality and feelings, this notion provides a fundamental and original core, or 
basis of recognition. Fang thus denoted it as a “seed of wisdom” (zhihui chongzi 
智慧种子). Tang Junyi’s epistemology also implies both a theory of knowledge 
and a theory of wisdom. In Tang’s philosophy, intuition and reason are thor-
oughly interconnected. Based on this interconnection and the mutual influence 
amongst the different mechanisms and segments of the heart-mind, and with 
the help of analytical philosophy, Tang formulated an innovative and very in-
teresting hypothesis regarding the creativity of wisdom (zhihuide chuangzaoxing 
智慧的創造性). For him, knowledge (zhishi 知識) includes ideas or concepts, 
logical cognitive laws, inferences, and empirical intuition. Wisdom, however, is 
understood as a kind of “miraculous creativity” (shenmiaode chuangzaoxing 神秒
的創造性), i.e. a type of intuitive reasoning that is neither completely empir-
ical, nor exclusively rational. It is a kind of thought that can apply previously 
obtained knowledge, but only based on prior independent decisions for such ap-
plication. As such, knowledge is both integrated and surpassed. In both theories, 
morality plays a central role, because it represents the foundation of the Self and 
thus of the heart-mind. In this regard, Tang argues that his concept of rational 
intuition is able to directly “penetrate” the patterns that were established on the 
grounds of synthesizing premises, and so can rather easily obtain valid conclu-
sions. This, of course, implies that rational intuition is above logical reason. At 
the same time, however, Tang believes that pure rational intuition can only lead 
to knowledge and not wisdom, because it is only capable of non-inferential rea-
soning. He has also never fully elaborated on or analysed in detail his notion of 
“miraculous creative wisdom.” All that can be said of this idea is merely that it 
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is founded on the moral heart-mind, which is understood as a vital part of the 
human Self, and that it functions instantly and unconsciously.
In contrast, Mou Zongsan criticized the traditional concepts of intuition and wis-
dom, claiming that they have had a devastating impact on Chinese history:
Historically, Confucian theoretical works had always treated intuition 
as a manifestation of the personality of a sage or a saint, i.e. in terms of 
the magical effects of wisdom… These effects were always posited within 
humanity (or mutuality, ren), and therefore could not be separated from 
it, even temporarily, in order to gain “pure recognition”. This is why logic 
and mathematics were never developed in China9 (Mou Zongsan in Han 
and Zhao 1994, 176).
However, on the basis of elaborating and synthesizing Kant’s epistemology, Mou 
also developed a concept of specifically Chinese intellectual intuition (zhide zhi-
jue 智的直覺) that enabled people to perceive and comprehend not only objects 
from the phenomenal world, but also the sphere of noumena10. When manifest 
in humans, this kind of “divine recognition” (Mou 1971, 51) is certainly a kind 
of wisdom. 
The traditional Confucian notion of wisdom was also developed and modernized 
by several philosophers, who until recently have not been seen as Modern (or 
contemporary) Confucians, but rather as purely Marxist theoreticians. This holds 
particularly true for Jin Yuelin’s student Feng Qi, and his innovative work in the 
development of Chinese epistemology. 
While Jin Yuelin’s theories of knowledge were based upon the traditional Western 
understanding of epistemology as a discipline limited to a pure theory of knowl-
edge, Feng attempted to extend this approach and, based on traditional Chinese 
discourses, sought to create an epistemology in a broader sense, which he called 
“expanded epistemology” (guangyi renshi lun 廣義認識論). 
He believed that epistemology should not be limited to the theory of knowl-
edge, but should also include the problem of exploring wisdom. In this context, 
he strove to consider all the basic approaches to the main philosophical issues 
9 在以前的儒家學術發展中, 始終是停在聖賢人格中的直覺形態上, 及智慧輝妙用的型態…它
總是上屬而渾化於仁中, 而未暫時脫離呼仁而成為 »純粹的知性«. 因此, 邏輯數學都出不來.
10 Mou Zongsan tried to define the position of reason within traditional Chinese thought by compar-
ing Western and Chinese cultures, arguing that they were based on different representational forms 
of human reason. He called the Chinese form “functional or intensive” (lixingzhi yunyong biaoxian 
理性運用表現) and the Western “constructive or extensive” (lixingzhi jiagou biaoxian 理性架構表
現) (Mou 1995, 544–53).
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of both ancient and modern times. For him, these basic approaches were clearly 
expressed in both Western metaphysical inquiries and in the ancient Chinese 
methods of cultivating the ideal personality. Similar endeavours were also clear-
ly visible in his general philosophical and/or methodological research, through 
which he tried to establish a new approach to solving the contradiction between 
the natural sciences and humanities. His attempt to transcend the boundaries 
between ignorance and knowledge, and his theory of distinguishing between 
knowledge and wisdom, not only referred to epistemological problems, but also 
implied ontological and metaphysical issues. By consistently integrating onto-
logical and ethical suppositions into the framework of his “expanded epistemol-
ogy,” Feng provided a unique and original solution to the dichotomous relations 
of substance and phenomena. His epistemological system, which included sys-
tematic, rational distinctions, as well as a holistic reunification of comprehen-
sion, was a felicitous attempt at establishing a theoretical framework that could 
provide the basis for fresher, more complex methodologies in contemporary 
theoretical discourses (Feng 1983, 54).
For Chen Lai, wisdom belongs to the four central Confucian virtues, which are 
categorized into ethics (Chen 2014, 251). Confucianism, since the time of Con-
fucius, emphasizes “practical wisdom” as the realization of philosophy: 
This approach accentuates the practical aspects of wisdom rather than 
the analytical rationale of the intellect.
Emphasison practical wisdom persistently reinforces a moral foundation 
that is not differentiated from personal virtue. At the same time, prac-
tical wisdom in Confucianism stresses self-cultivation, or the complete 
transformation of the self, derived from the internal state of the heart/
mind (xin). Finally, Confucianism insists that practical wisdom must be 
transformed into practical action. (Chen 2015, 69) 
In his commentaries on Feng Youlan’s philosophy, Chen Lai also exposes the dif-
ference between moral and intellectual (or, in Feng’s own words, “non-moral”) 
knowledge, pointing out that they belong to two different categories of rational-
ity. These two types of rationality must be sharply distinguished, for the objects 
of moral rationality are moral principles, whereas those of intellectual rationality 
are existing laws (Chen and Xin 2007, 368). He also lays stress upon the fact 
that one of the main critiques of Confucianism by classical Western theories of 
modernization was centred on said theories’ suppositions that Confucian ethics 
were incompatible with the rationalization inherent in the process of modern-
ization. In this regard, the very Confucian concept of wisdom was seen as one 
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of the main culprits for this “incompatibleness,” because Confucianism allegedly 
“stressed the wisdom of feelings rather than knowledge born of experience and 
assessment” (Chen 2009, 234). This was one of the central claims in the theories 
of Talcott Parsons, Weber’s successor, who in the 1960s established the hypothesis 
that Confucianism was an obstacle to modernization. However, only a decade 
later the prevailing opinion on the relation between Confucianism and modern-
ization had radically changed not only in the Asian academic world, but also in 
the Euro-American one. 
Conclusion
As we have seen above, the Modern Confucian emphasis on the traditional Con-
fucian link between comprehension and the ethical evaluation of being is an 
important part of the related epistemology. This epistemology, which cannot be 
separated from ontology, is of utmost importance for the gradual restoration 
of the “credibility” of ancient Chinese thought in the context of modern social 
knowledge. In the framework of such onto-epistemological discourses, the im-
parting of meaning does not refer solely to the subject, but also to his or her 
intimate connection with fellow human beings who are thus seen as being some-
thing more than just the “Others”. In this sense, such discourses could be well on 
their way to establishing a new, specifically East Asian model of modernity. Such 
a model is by no means grounded in individualism, (which is, in the framework 
of classical Western modernization theories, an absolutely necessary precondi-
tion for any kind of modernization), but rather in the abovementioned notion of 
individualization.
A subject in the sense of a moral Self, who is––in addition to analytical and 
rational skills also endowed with intuition and wisdom, represents one of the 
possible Modern Confucian responses to the global questions of the present 
time. These questions are linked to the dilemmas of the modern subject who is 
trapped within the complex technologies of the profit-seeking natural world, 
and has thus forgotten the ethical dimensions which define his or her humanity. 
A new East Asian social epistemology, which could be based upon the Confu-
cian notions of values and wisdom, might represent an instrumental factor in 
reviving traditional values and sensibly adapting them to the requirements of 
the new social knowledge, making them suitable for the lives of people in both 
modern and post-modern eras. The digital period in which we live is defined 
by an overflow of factual, auditory, and visual information, along with the ac-
companying overburdening of people’s sensory organs. In such times, wisdom, 
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which is a characteristic feature of Confucian sages, can be more than useful, 
especially considering the fact that the original meaning11 of the Chinese term 
sage (sheng ren) is “one who listens carefully”. 
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